Golden Gate University Law Review
Volume 22
Issue 2 Notes and Comments

Article 15

January 1992

The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: Further
Defining the Rights and Duties of Artists and Real
Property Owners
Matthew A. Goodin

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Matthew A. Goodin, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: Further Defining the Rights and Duties of Artists and Real Property Owners, 22
Golden Gate U. L. Rev. (1992).
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol22/iss2/15

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.

Goodin: Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990

THE VISUAL ARTISTS RIGHTS
ACT OF 1990: FURTHER
DEFINING THE RIGHTS AND
DUTIES OF ARTISTS AND REAL
PROPERTY OWNERS
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1937, the Rutgers Presbyterian Church in Manhattan
invited painters·to enter a competition to design and paint a
mural on the rear wall of the church and unanimously selected the
designs and sketches of artist Alfred D. Crimi. l After the mural
was completed, some parishioners objected to the painting feeling
that "a portrayal of Christ with so much of his chest bare placed
more emphasis on His physical attributes than on His spiritual
qualities."2 The objections evidently grew louder, for in 1946 the
mural was painted over without the artist being notified. 3
Crimi sued to compel the church to remove the overpaint,
or in the alternative, to have the fresco returned to him.4 He
based his suit on the doctrine of droit moral,6 which recognizes
a legally protectible interest in the physical integrity of a
work of art even after it is sold. The court was unable to find
any American authority for the doctrine and ruled against
him, rationalizing that if Crimi desired to retain rights in his
work, he should have done so in the contract.s
In 1980, the Bank of Tokyo decided to remove from the
lobby of its Wall Street branch a massive sculpture by the well1. Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813, 813-14 (Sup. Ct.
1949).
2. Id. at 815.
3. Id. Forty years later, Crimi recalled the experience: "I cannot describe the
trauma that gradually overtook me. 1 could not believe that it was possible, iIi the
twentieth century, that such a bestial mentality existed." Levy, Artists' Moral Rights:
Will Federal Legislation Have any Real Impact in Deterring the Mutilation and
Destruction of Artworks?, 11 L.A. LAw. 11 (Mar. 1988).
4. Crimi, 89 N.Y.S. 2d at 815.
5. See generally, Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HAsTINGS L.J.
1023 (1976) and Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists,
Authors aryl Creators, 53 HARVARD L. REV. 554 (1940) for a more complete discussion
of droit ,poral.
6. Crimi, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 819.
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known American artist, Isamu Noguchi. In order to remove the
sculpture, the Bank had to cut it into pieces, effectively
destroying it.? Again, the artist was not notified. Noguchi felt
the Bank's action was "vandalism," but he was left with no legal
recourse; he had transferred all his property rights in the
sculpture to the Bank. 8
These two examples illustrate the competing interests of
artists and real property owners when artwork is incoporated
into buildings. While eleven states have enacted legislation
creating moral rights for artists,9 until recently there was no
federal law addressing the issue. The Visual Artists Rights Act
of 1990,10 which became effective June 1, 1991,11 creates federal
moral rights for artists l2 and contains provisions specifically
covering artwork incorporated into buildings. 13 This article
will begin with a brief overview ofVARA and a detailed analysis
of the provisions covering artwork incorporated into buildings.
The focus of the article will address the many problems
concerning the rights and duties of artists and real property
owners under VARA, and will propose solutions to these
problems that will best serve the interests of both.
II.

THE VISUAL ARTISTS RIGHTS ACT

A.

AN

OVERVIEW

VARA preserves the right of attribution and integrity for
works of visual art. I. The right of attribution allows artists to
7. Gleuck, Bank Cuts Up Noguchi Sculpture and Stores It, N.Y. Times, Apr. 19,
1980, § I, at I, col. 4.
8. Id.
9. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 980-990 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§§ 42-116s to 42-116t (West 1987); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 51:2151-51:2156 (West 1987);
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 27 § 303 (West 1988); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 231 § 85S (West
Supp. 1991); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 598.970-.978 (1987); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:24A-l to
2A:24- 8 (West 1987); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 56-11-1 to 56-11-3 (Michie 1986); N.Y. Arts·
& Cult. Aff. Law §§ 11.01-16.01 (West 1984 & Supp. 1992); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73 §§
2101-2110 (Purdon Supp. 1991); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 5-62-2 to 5-62-6 (Michie 1987).
10. The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101- 650, Title IV, 104 S.tat.
5089, 5128 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (Supp.
1991) [hereinafter VARA].
11. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A [Note (a)] (Supp. 1991) which states that the Act will take
effect six months after the date of the enactment of the Act, which was Dec. I, 1990.
12. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (Supp. 1991).
13. See 17 U.S.C. § 113(d) (Supp. 1991).
14. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 & 106A (Supp. 1991). Under VARA, "a work of
visual art" covers paintings, drawings, prints, SCUlptures and still photographic images
produced for exhibition purposes only, existing in a single copy or in a limited edition
of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author. The
Act specifically excludes motion pictures and other audiovisual work, as well as such
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claim authorship of their work, or to prevent the use of their
name as the author of a work which they did not create. 16
This right also allows an artist to prevent the use of his or
her name as the author of a work in the event the work is
distorted, mutilated, or otherwise modified in such a way that
would be prejudicial to the artist's reputation. IS
The right of integrity allows the artist to prevent any
intentional distortion, mutilation or other modification of the
work that would be prejudicial to the artist's honor or
reputation. 17 It also allows the artist to prevent any intentional
or grossly negligent destruction of a work of recognized quality.18
These rights vest only in the author of the work, and exist for
the lifetime of the author.19 VARA also provides that these rights
exist apart from any copyright in the work, and transfer of
copyright will not affect the rights conferred by VARA.20 The
rights may not be transferred, but may be waived if the author
expressly agrees to such a waiver in a signed written instrument.21
B.

REMOVAL OF WORKS OF VISUAL

ART FROM BUILDINGS

VARA amends section 113 of the Copyright Act to afford
protection to artists whose works of art are incorporated into
buildings. 22 This section provides different prophylactic
measures depending on whether the work of art can be removed
without alteration or destruction.1S
If a work of art has been incorporated into a building in such
a way that its removal would cause "destruction, distortion,
mutilation or other modification"2. of the work, then the rights
things as maps, charts, technical drawings and applied art. All merchandising,
advertising and promotional items are also excluded. Any work made for hire or other
work not subject to copyright is also excluded. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. 1991).
15. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (Supp. 1991) (Rights of Attribution and
Integrity).
16. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(2)(Supp. 1991).
17. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (Supp. 1991).
18. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B) (Supp. 1991).
19. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106A(b) (Scope and Exercise of Rights) & 106A(d) (Duration of
Rights) (Supp. 1991).
20. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(b) (Supp. 1991).
21. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e) (Supp. 1991).
22. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 113(d) (Supp. 1991) (Removal ofWorka of Visual Art
from Buildings).
23. [d.
24. Hereinafter, the word "alteration" will be used to encompass the cumbersome
statutory language "destruction, distortion, mutilation or other modification."
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of integrity and attribution will apply unless expressly waived
by the artist. 26 The artist will be deemed to have waived the
rights if he or she consented to the installation of the work
before June 1, 1991, or executed a written waiver on or after
June 1, 1991. 26 The written waiver must specify that the
installation of the work may subject it to alteration by reason
of its removal, and must be signed by both the artist and the
building owner.27
If the building owner wishes to remove a work of art that
can be removed without alteration, the rights of integrity and
attribution will apply unless the owner makes a diligent, good
faith attempt, without success, to notify the artist of the
intended action. 28 The artist will also lose his or her rights if
the building owner successfully notifies the artist, but the
artist fails within 90 days after receiving the notice either to
remove the work or pay for its removal,29 If the artist does pay
for the removal of the work, title to that work will vest in the
artist. 30

The following analysis will attempt to define further the
rights and duties and real property owners under amended
section 113. The analysis will focus on five areas: (1) consent
and related contractual issues; (2) burdens of proof and setting
a standard for determining whether a work of art can be
removed without alteration; (3) the problem of works made for
hire; (4) notification issues; and (5) possible problems posed by
the doctrine of aesthetic nuisance.

III. FURTHER DEFINING RIGHTS AND DUTIES UNDER
VARA
A.

CONSENT AND RELATED CONTRACTUAL ISSUES

If an artist consents to have his work incorporated into a
building in such a manner that its removal would cause
25. 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(1)(AHB) (Supp. 1991).
26. 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(I)(B) (Supp. 1991).
27.Id.
28. 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 1991). VARA provides that the Register of
Copyrights shall establish a registry system whereby the artist of a work that has been
incorporated into a building may record his or her identity and address with the
Copyright Office. 17 U.S.C. § 113(dX3). VARA further states that a building owner shall
be presumed to have made a good faith attempt to notify if the owner sent notice to
the artist's most recent address recorded with the Register. 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(2)(B).
29. 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(2)(B) (Supp. 1991).
30.Id.
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alteration of the work, the artist's rights of integrity and
attribution will not apply.31 Because VARA specifically requires
a written instrument signed by both the artist and the property
owner to effect consent,32 it is manifest that an oral consent
shall not be binding. The statutory language also requires that
the written consent specify that the installation of the work
may subject it to alteration in the event of removal, not just that
the work may be installed. 33 It is imperative that courts strictly
scrutinize an apparent consent by the artist and must not
imply consent by the artist in an ordinary contract to install
a work of art in or on a building.
The precise scope of consent and its binding effect are
somewhat ambiguous under VARA. The written consent is to
be signed by both the artist and the property owner, implying
that these are the only parties bound by the agreement.
However, perhaps significantly, the statutory language
preserving to the artist the rights of integrity and attribution
does not specify that the artist may prevent only the owner of
the work of art from destroying or altering it. Instead, VARA
broadly provides that the "author of a work of visual art shall
have the right ... to prevent any intentional distortion,
mutilation or other modification ... [and] to prevent any
destruction of a work of recognized stature .... "34
This language implies that the artist may prevent anyone
from harming his or her work. VARA provides that in the
event of written consent, the rights of integrity and attribution
"shall not apply."36 Does this mean that if the artist consents
to installation of a work in a building , he or she loses all
rights in the work? If this is the case, parties other than the
property owner may be free to alter or destroy the work. If
Crimi had consented to installation of his work under VARA,
the angry parishoners may have been free to paint over his
fresco. 36 Presumably the property owner, as owner of the work
of art, would have a cause of action against the harming third
31. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
32. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
33. 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(1)(B) (Supp. 1991) reads in pertinent part: "[the] written
instrument [must specify] that installation of the work may subject the work to
[alteration], by reason of its removal ...."
34. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (Supp. 1991).
35. 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(1)(B) (Supp. 1991).
36. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
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party under common law notions of property law,s7 but if the
owner declined to pursue a cause of action, the artist may be
left without any personal legal redress. This ambiguity could
be easily resolved by amending the section to read that if
consent is given by the artist, the rights of integrity and
attribution "shall not apply only as against all owners of the
property and their successors in interest." This added clause
would serve to limit the scope of the artist's consent to allow
only the property owner and his or her successors in interest
to alter the work of art, and preserve in the artist a cause of
action against any tenant or other member of the public who
destroys or alters the work.
Another ambiguity arises in subsections (d)(1)(B) and (d)(2)
of section 113. Consent by the artist will waive all rights, but
the statute does not specify that the rights will be waived
only in the event of an actual removal of the work of art. This
would seem to be the intended effect of the legislation,38 but as
worded, the statute would allow an owner who has received
consent from an artist to freely alter the work of art even
though the owner may never intend to remove it. Specifically,
under subsection (d)(2), the owner of the building could wish
to remove the work,s9 change his mind, and then be free to alter
the work with impunity. By specifying that consent by the
artist will only waive the artist's rights in the event of an
actual removal, the statute would achive its intended effect.
Limiting the scope of consent in the above manner would
have several beneficial effects. If artists understand that their
consent will have a limited effect, they will be more likely to
give consent. Because consent will be more freely given by
artists, more property owners may be encouraged to incorporate
works of art into their buildings, and artists and the public as
a whole will benefit.
37. The common law action of "trespass on the case- provides a damage remedy
for indirect or consequential injury to real or personal property resulting from a
wrongful act, intentional or negligent, of the defendant. See O. BROWDER, R.
CUNNINGHAM, G. NELSON, W. STOEBUCK AND D. WHITMAN, BASIC PROPERTY LAw at 22,
(5th ed. 1989). Actions may also be held under various state vandalism laws. See, e.g.,
CAL. PENAL CODE § 594 (West Supp. 1992) which provides in pertinent part: "Every
person who maliciously (1) defaces with paint or any other liquid, (2) damages or (3)
destroys any real or personal property not his own ... is guilty of vandalism:
38. 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(l)(B) (Supp. 1991) provides that the written instrument
effecting consent must specify that installation of the work may subject it to aiteration
"by reason of its removar (emphasis added). Section 113(d)(2) begins "[i]fthe owner
of a building wishes to remove a work of visual art . ... - (emphasis added).
39. See supra note 38.
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In an ideal situation, the artist and the property owner
would sit down at the bargaining table dealing at arms length,
each fully informed and each in an equal position of bargaining
power. Unfortunately, this idyllic scene is not reality. The
reality is that few artists and property owners will be aware
ofVARA and the various protections it offers. Because of this
reality, one can easily imagine the following scenario taking
place:
A property owner owns a building into which a work of art
has been incorporated. The property owner is losing money on
the building, and wants to tear it down in order to make more
efficient use of the land. In the course of destroying the
building, the work of art is also destroyed without the artist
being notified. The artist finds out that the work has been
destroyed, and seeks the advice of an attorney. The attorney
conducts the necessary research, and informs the artist of the
rights under VARA. An action is brought with the artist
claiming that the work of art could not have been removed
without destroying the work, and since the property owner did
not get a written consent from the artist, the artist's rights of
integrity were still in force and therefore, the property owner
is liable for damages. 4o The property owner will claim that
the work of art could have been removed without destruction,
and since the artist did not register with the Registry and
therefore could not be located, the artist is not entitled to
damages. But because the artwork has been destroyed, it is
impossible to determine whether the work of art could have
been removed without alteration, so whomever has the burden
of proof on that issue will lose. Unfortunately, VARA is silent
with respect to burdens of proof.
To place the entire burden of proof on either party in the
above situation would seem inequitable. If the artist must
prove that the work of art could not be removed without
alteration, the artist would rarely be able to maintain a cause
of action. 41 On the other hand, if the property owner had to
40. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) provides for remedies and damages co· extensive with that
of copyright under Title 17. except there will be no criminal offenses under VARA as
under 17 U.S.C. § 506.
41. See infra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
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prove that the work of art could be removed, the property
owner would rarely be able to maintain a defense to an artist's
cause of action. Instead, a practical standard is needed for
determining whether a work of art can be removed from a
building without alteration.
2. A Standard For Determining Whether a Work of Art Can
Be Removed Without Destruction
With today's modern painting techniques, experts in the
field believe most works of art can be removed without
harm;2 but in some cases the cost may be prohibitive. 43 If a
work could be removed, but only with considerable expense,
then it may be said that the work can be removed without
alteration and the artist would lose his or her rights if the
property owner is unable to locate him or her in good faith.
If the artist is notified, he or she will likely be unable to
afford the cost of removing the work without destroying it.
On the other hand, there are certain works of art that will
clearly be unremovable without alteration,'· and to prevent
the property owner from tearing down a building just because
a work of art is incorporated into the building is equally
unfair.
42. See Gantz, Protecting Artists' Moral Rights: A Critique of the California Art
Preservation Act as a Model for Statutory Reform, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 873, 885 n.81
(1981). Most modern murals are made from water-base paints which roll off easily, and
thus could be removed without harm to the work. Older techniques used oil-base paints
on wet or dry plaster. ld. (citing an interview with art historian Carl Baldwin, New
York City (Nov. 1979».
43. See Karlen, Moral Rights in California, 19 S.D.L.REV. 675, 717 (1982). In
discussing the California Art Preservation Act, which contains a provision similiar to
VARA § 604, Karlen says: MIn many instsnces, if the owner expended a fortune in hiring
experts and workmen to delicately remove works of art which were difficult to excise,
then it would be said that the owner could remove without substantial damage. ~ Id.
(emphasis in original).
44. See, e.g., Crimi, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 814. The method of fresco painting was
described by Crimi as follows:
Fresco painting is done on wet plaster. The color adheres to
the plaster through chemical action-the union of carbonic
acid gas and lime oxide producing carbonate of lime as the
water evaporates on the surface of the plaster. In fresco, no
binding agent need be mixed with the pigment as in other
painting processes; the pigments are simply well ground in
water and applied to the wet surface. As the plaster dries, the
color is actually incorporated in the plaster and-if the work
is properly executed-the painting is assured a permanence
surpassing that achieved in any other method of wall
decoration.ld.
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To rectify this problem, courts must imply a reasonable cost
requirement when interpreting these provisions. 46 The cost
to remove a work should not be limited to the mere expense
involved in removing it, but should also allow consideration of
other factors. In determining whether the cost to remove a work
of art without destroying it is reasonable, courts should
examine two important factors: (1) the importance of the
property owner's intended action affecting the work of art;
and (2) the value of the work of art in relation to the value of
the property and the expense required to remove the work. If
this standard is applied faithfully, allocating the burden of proof
can be done with less harsh results.
The artist would make a prima facie case of a violation of
rights under VARA merely by proving that the work has
been altered. The property owner can then defend by showing
that the importance of the action that caused the work to be
destroyed outweighed the value of the work of art. Destruction
of a building because of substantial monetary loss,
neighborhood revitalization, or condemnation would be
actions that would be deemed important. The case would
then fall under sub-section (d)(2) and the property owner
would only have to prove he or she made a good faith attempt
to notify the artist without success, or that the artist was
notified, and failed to remove the work within 90 days.
Presumably, if the property owner wished to remove the
work merely because he or she found it distasteful, the
property owner's action affecting the work would not be
deemed important. The case would then fall under subsection (d)(l), and the property owner would be liable for
damages unless he or she was able to obtain a written consent
from the artist.
If a reasonable cost requirement is applied, it should further
clarify the intent of the legislature that these two sections be
mutually exclusive. Allocating a burden of proof can be done
without harsh results, more artwork can be preserved for the
community, and property owners will not be prevented from
taking necessary actions with their property.
45. See Petrovich, Artists' Statutory Droit Moral in California: A Critical
Appraisal, 15 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 29 (1981) for a similiar suggestion in interpreting The
California Art Preservation Act.
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WORKS MADE FOR HIRE

Significantly, "works made for hire"'& are excluded from
protection under VARA. Because many works of art
incorporated in buildings may be specially ordered or
commissioned, this exclusion may seem to create a large
loophole in VARA: VARA purports to protect works of art
incorporated into buildings, but if such a work is found to be
a "work made for hire," it will lose protection.
A recent unanimous decision by the Supreme Court resolved
the conflict in lower courts'7 over the proper construction of the
"work made for hire" provision of the Revised Copyright Act.
In Community Center for Non-Violence v. Reid,'s the Court
clarified the standard for determining whether a work qualifies
as a "work made for hire." The Court first stated that Congress
intended to provide two mutually exclusive ways for a work to
qualify as a "work made for hire": one for employees working in
the scope of employment and the other for specially ordered or
commissioned works created by independent contractors. 49 The
Court then stated that since nine specific classes of works were
enumerated in the second clause of the "work made for hire"
definition,60 only those classes of works could qualify as a "work
46. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. 1990) which provides in pertinent part:
A 'work made for hire' is(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of
his or her employment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a
contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion
picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a
supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional
text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas,
if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument
signed by them that the work shall be considered a work
made for hire ....

Id.
47. The Second, Fourth and Seventh Circuits had adopted variations of an
"actual control" test to determine whether a party is an employeo for the purposes of
the "work made for hire" provision. See, e.g., Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc.,
738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984); Brunswick Beacon, Inc. v.
Schock·Hopchas Publishing Co., 810 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1987); Evans Newton, Inc. v.
Chicago Sys. Software, 793 F.2d 889 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986). The
Fifth Circuit had applied a common law agency test, see, e.g., Easter Seal Soc'y v.
Playboy Enter., 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 981 (1988).
Finally, the Ninth Circuit had ruled that only formal salaried employees met the
definition. Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1989).
48. 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
49. ld. at 747·8.
50. See supra note 46.
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made for hire" if created by an independent contractor.61 The
Court held that courts shall apply the common law of agency to
determine whether an author of a work was an employee or an
independent contractor.62 In applying the common law of agency
test, the Court analyzed a number of factors including: the
hiring party's right to control the project; the skill required of the
free-lancer; the source of the tools used to create the work; the
location where the work was done; the duration of the
relationship between the parties; the hiring party's right to
assign additional projects; and the method of payment. 63
Few artists creating works to be incorporated into buildings
will be working as an employee of the building owner, rather,
most will be working as independent contractors. Therefore,
they will only lose protection under VARA if their work falls into
one of the nine specific classes and the parties have signed a
written instrument specifying that the work is a "work made
for hire."64 It is very unlikely an artist's work will fall into any
of the nine specified classes. 66 Effectively then, the only way
such a work may lose protection is upon a court finding that the
artist was an employee of the property owner (or any other
party directing control over the artist). This is also unlikely, as
illustrated by the Reid case. 66
51. Reid, 490 U.S. at 748.
52. [d. at 751.

53. [d. at 751. The Court also considered the extent of the hired party's discretion
over when and how long to work, the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants,
whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party, whether the hiring
party is in business, the provision of employee benefits and the tax treatment of the
hired party. [d. at 751-52.
54. See supra note 46.
55. The nine specified classes are: (1) a contribution to a collective work; (2) a part
of a moton picture or other audiovisual work; (3) a translation; (4) a supplementary
work; (5) a compilation; (6) an instructional text; (7) a test; (8) answer material for a
test; and (9) an atlas. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1986). A ·collective work" is defined as ·a work,
such as a periodical issue, anthology, or encyclopedia, in which a number of
contributions, constituting separate and independent works in themselves, are
assembled into a collective whole." [d. A compilation is defined as "a work formed by
the collection and assembling of pre-existing materials or of data that are selected,
coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes
an original work of authorship." [d. The term ·compilation" includes collective works.
[d. A ·supplementary work" is defined as "a work prepared for publication as a
secondary adjunct to a work by another author for the purpose of introducting,
concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising, commenting upon, or assisting in the use
of the other work ... ." [d.
56 In that case, a sculptor, James Reid, was hired to sculpt a nativity scene, with
a homeless family as the subject, for CCNY. Reid, 490 U.S. at 730. In analyzing
Reid's status in this relationship, the Court applied the agency test in the following
manner: CCNY asserted control over the project; Reid was practicing a skilled
occupation using his own tools; Reid did the work in his own studio; Reid was hired
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Although the Court in Reid decided the work for hire issue,
they remanded the case to the district court to decide whether
Reid's sculpture could be considered a work of joint
authorship.57 The case was settled before the district court
passed on the issue. 68
VARA provides that in the case of a joint work prepared by
two or more authors, anyone of the authors may waive all
rights for all authors.59 This is significant because all joint
authors may not agree on whether to waive rights and if an
artist and a property owner were found to be joint authors, their
interests may be in opposition.
The Copyright Act defines a joint work as "a work prepared
by two or more authors with the intention that their
contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent
parts of a unitary whole."80 One commentator describes the
terms "inseparable" and "interdependent" as follows:
[I]f author B's contribution, when combined
with author A's contribution results in
recasting, transforming or adapting Ns
contribution, then the two contributions
may be said to be inseparable. If the process
is simply one of assembling into a collective
whole Ns and B's respective contributions,
without thereby recasting Ns contribution,
then the two contributions may be said to be
interdependen t. 81
only for this one project; CCNY had no rights to assign additional projects; Reid was
retained for two months; and payment was conditioned on completion of the statue.
Id. at 752-53. In analyzing the rest of the factors, see supra note 53, the Court found
apart from the deadline, Reid had absolute freedom in deciding when and how long
to work, Reid had total discretion in hiring and paying assistants, creating sculptures
was hardly a regular business for CCNY, in fact CCNY was not a business at all, and
finally, CCNY did not pay payroll or Social Security taxes, provide any employee
benefits, or contribute to unemployment insurance or workers' compensation funds.
Id. at 753. Weighing these factors, the Court concluded that all of them, except the
assertion of control by CCNY, weighed -heavily against finding an employee
relationship," and Reid could not be considered an employee ofCCNV. Id.
57. Id. at 753.
58. Interview with Thomas Goetzl, Professor of Law at Golden Gate University
School of Law, in San Francisco (Apr. 1991).
59. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e) (Supp. 1991) (Transfer and Waiver).
60. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. 1991).
61. 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 6.04 at 6-11 (1989).
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It is clear that if an artist wants to preserve his or her
rights, the artist must be careful not to allow the property
owner to assert too much control over the work. This will
rarely be an issue. Realistically, a property owner will rarely
assert any control over the project, let alone enough to
transform the work into a "joint work." To avoid having an
artist's creation become a "work made for hire," the artist
should, if possible, work in his or her own studio. The contract
to create the work should specify that payment will be made
upon completion of the work, and if the property owner wants
the artist to create several works, each work should be covered
by a separate contract. In addition, the artist should read the
contract carefully and should not sign any contract that
specifies that the work will be treated as a "work made for hire"
unless that is the artist's intent. To prevent a work from
becoming a "joint work," the artist must simply preserve
artistic control over the project in the contract.

D.

NOTIFICATION OF THE ARTIST

Under section 113(d)(2), if a work of art can be removed from
a building without harm, the artist's rights will apply unless
the property owner has made a good faith attempt, without
success to notify the artist, or has notified the artist and the
artist failed within ninety days to remove the work or pay for
its removal. 62 Artists should· be encouraged to record their
identity and address with the Register of Copyrights as
provided in VARA. This will allow the artist to be notified
easily in case the property owner wishes to remove the work,
and will allow the artist to preserve the work if he or she so
desires.
Assume, however, that an artist has not registered his or her
name and address, and cannot be located by the property owner,
or that after being notified, the artist declines to remove the
work. In these cases, the property owner is free to dispose of the
work in any manner. VARA assumes that the artist's interest in
preserving the work is the only interest at work in this situation.
This may not be the case. The public as a whole, as well as
many art or landmark preservation groups also have a strong
interest in seeing works of art preserved for the community. 63
62. 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(2)(A)-(B) (Supp. 1991).

63. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 989(a) (West Supp. 1992) where the legislature finds
and declares that "there is a public interest in preserving the integrity of cultural and
artistic creations."
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With these interests in mind, VARA should be amended to
allow public or private non-profit organizations an opportunity
to pay for the removal and preservation of a work incorporated
in a building if the artist cannot be notified, or if the artist after
receiving notice, fails to remove the work. M In either of these
two situations, assuming a property owner desires to remove
the work of art in such a manner that it will be destroyed, the
property owner, before taking such action, should be required
to publish notice of the intended action in a public newspaper.
Any organization wishing to preserve the work of art would
then be required to notify the property owner of its intentions,
and would be allowed a period of ninety days after the
publication date during which to pay for the removal of the
work. If the organization should fail within ninety days to
remove the work, the property owner would then be allowed to
remove the work in any manner desired. If an organization
agrees to remove the work, and pays for its removal, title to the
64. This proposal is modelled on Cal. Civ. Code § 989 (West Supp.
1992)(Preservation of Cultural and Artistic Creations). That section reads in pertinent
part:
(e) Removal from Real property. (1) If a work of fine art cannot
be removed from real property without substantial physical
defacement ... no action ... may be brought under this section.
However, if an organization offers some evidence giving rise to a
reasonable likelihood that a work of art can be removed ... without
substantial physical defacement ... and is prepared to pay the cost
of removal of the work, it may bring a legal action for determination
of this issue. In that action, the organization shall be entitled to
injunctive relief to preserve the integrity of the work of fine art, but
shall also have the burden of proof....
(2) If the owner of the real property wishes to remove a work
of fine art which is part of the real property, but which can be
removed from the real property without substantial harm to such
fine art, and in the course of or after removal, the owner intends
to cause or allow the fine art to suffer from physical defacement
... the owner shall do the following:
(A) If the artist ... fails to take action to remove the work of
fine art after [being notified], the owner shall provide 30 days' notice
of his or her intended action affecting the work of art. The written
notice shall be a display advertisement in a newspaper of general
circulation in the area where the fine art is located ....
(i) If within the 30-day period an organization agrees to
remove the work of art and pay the cost of removal of the work, the
payment and removal shall occur within 90 days of the first day of
the 30-day notice.
(ii) If the work is removed at the expense of an organization,
title to the fine art shall pass to that organization.
(iii) If an organization does not agree to remove the work of
fine art within the 30-day period or fails to remove and pay the cost
of removal of the work of fine art within the 90-day period the owner
may take the intended action affecting the work of fine art. .

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol22/iss2/15

14

Goodin: Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990

1992]

VISUAL ARTISTS RIGHTS ACT OF 1990

581

work would pass to the organization. The organization should
then be required to preserve the work of art for the community,
either by displaying the work itself, or by donating the work to
a museum, preferably one in the same area that the work of art
was orginally located.
This amendment would fully recognize all the interests at
work in this situation. The property owner would still be
allowed to remove the work if no one agreed to pay for its
removal, and one can hardly imagine that the property owner
has any preference as to whether an artist or a non-profit
organization actually pays to remove the work. The owner
would still be able to rely on a ninety day period to remove a
work. If the artist fails to remove, either because the artist
cannot afford to pay the removal costs, because the artist no
longer has any interest in preserving the work, or because
the artist simply cannot be located, instead of automatic
destruction of the work, there is a chance that it may be
preserved for the public.

E.

THE POSSIBLE PROBLEM OF AESTHETIC NUISANCE

Courts display a decided reluctance to recognize nuisance
actions based on notions of aesthetics. 66 Courts have been
reluctant to delve into this area, usually reasoning that there
are no objective standards by which to judge matters of taste"
or that an unaesthetic use of land does not constitute a
substantial invasion of interests in surrounding property
owners in the use and enjoyment of their land. 67 There are,
65. See generally Coletta, The Case for Aesthetic Nuisance: Rethinking Traditional
Judicial Attitudes, 48 Ohio St. L.J. 141 (1987) for an excellent analysis of the doctrine
in general as well as an analysis of how the doctrine has traditionally been interpreted
by courts.
66. See, e.g., Ness v. Albert, 665 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. App. 1983). -Aesthetic
considerations are frought with subjectivity. One man's pleasure may be another man's
perturbation, and vice versa. What is aesthetically pleasing to one may totally
displease another- 'beauty is in the eye of the beholder.' Judicial forage into such an
area would be chaotic .... This court has no inclination to knowingly infuse the law
with such rampant uncertainty." [d. at 2. Cf. Clary v. Borough of Eatontown, 124 A.2d
54 (N.J. App. Div. 1956), where the court upheld larger lot-size zoning requirements
in a predominantly low-income municipality. The court stated -[i]t is no longer to be
doubted that [community attractiveness] is an appropriate consideration within the
statutory criterion of the 'general welfare.'" [d. at 64.
67. See, e.g., B & W Management, Inc. v. Tasea Investment Co., 451 A.2d 879 (D.C.
App. 1982). In an action by B & W to enjoin a nearby landowner from operating a
surface parking lot alleging the lot constituted a private nuisance because it damaged
the aesthetics of the neighborhood, the court disposed of the claim in one sentence:-B
& W's claim for damage to 'the aesthetics of the area' based on neighborhood 'blight'
does not amount to an assertion ofthe substantial interference with B & W's use and
enjoyment of its land required to sustain a private nuisance action." [d. at 883.
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however, several recent decisions that indicate a possible
change in attitude toward this doctrine. 68
The few cases that have upheld actions for aesthetic
nuisance have done so for such things as keeping wrecked
automobiles on a private lot,69 and an unsightly accumulation
of debris. 70 Whether an offensive or unsightly work of art
placed on, or incorporated in, a building could ever rise to the
level of aesthetic nuisance is questionable at best, but given the
recent decisions upholding use of the doctrine,71 one cannot rule
out the possibility. It is certainly feasible, under traditional
nuisance law, that the wall of a building on which a work of art
was placed could deteriorate to such a point that it posed a
danger to passers-by.72
Whether an action in such a situation is based on notions
of aesthetic or traditional nuisance, the success of such an
action would place the property owner in a bizarre Catch-22
under VARA. Assume a successful nuisance action is brought
against a property owner in which the court requires the
owner to tear down or repair the offending or dilapidated
work. Assume also that the artist that created the work had not
signed a written consent, and the artist's rights of integrity
were still in force. It may be difficult for the property owner to
remove the work, or repair the building, in such a way that the
work was altered or modified without violating the artist's
right of integrity. Significantly, however, VARA provides that
the modification of a work which is the result of conservation
68. See, e.g., Hay v. Stevens, 530 P.2d 37 (Or. Sup. Ct. 1975), where the plainifTs
asked the court to determine that a fence erected by their neighbors between the
plaintiff's property and a beach constituted a nuisance because of its unsightliness.
The court observed in dictum "[a]lthough there is authority to the contrary, we begin
with the assumption that in the appropriate case recovery will be permitted under the
law of nuisance for an interference with visual aesthetic sensibilities." Id at 39. See
also Foley v. Harris, 286 S.E.2d 186 (Va. Sup. Ct. 1982), where the Virginia Supreme
Court upheld a chancellor's decree enjoining defendants from keeping wrecked
automobiles on their lot, accepting the chancellor's notion that unsightliness alone can
form the basis of a nuisance action. Id. at 190-91; Allison v. Smith, 695 P.2d 791 (Colo.
App. 1984), holding that a legitimate but unsightly activity may constitute a private
nuisance.ld. at 794.
69. Foley, supra note 67.
70. Allison, supra note 67.
71. See supra note 67.
72. But see 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(1) (Supp. 1991) (Exceptions) which provides
that the modification of a work of art that is the result of passage of time or the inherent
nature of the materials is not an alteration, and therefore, not a violation of the artist's
rights conferred by the Act.
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is not a violation of the artist's rights, unless the modification
is caused by gross negligence. 73 Presumably then, a property
owner could repair a dilapidated building in such a way that
the artwork is also restored without violating any rights of the
artist.
It is clear then, that in the event of a successful nuisance
action against the property owner requiring the owner to take
action that would violate an artist's rights under the Act, that
the artist must be required to waive his rights. The property
owner should, however, make every effort to preserve the
work, or should attempt to notify the artist and allow the
artist the opportunity to preserve the work.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 presents an admirable
effort on the part of Congress to fashion moral rights for
artists on a federal level. The specific provision covering works
of art incorporated in buildings is an equally laudable attemp.t
to deal with the interests of artists and property owners that
often come into conflict. Because VARA is still in its seminal
stages, it is impossible to predict how courts will interpret its
various provisions, and harder still to predict how effectively
VARA will address the often competing interests of property
owners and artists.
The provision ofVARA covering works of art incorporated
in buidings as it currently reads does not completely address
all possible issues that may arise. If the interpretations
suggested in this article are followed by courts, VARA will
more effectively achieve its purpose. Congress must pay close
attention to how courts are interpreting VARA, and appropriate
amendments must be made in the event that VARA is not
being applied as envisioned. If this is done, artists in the
United States may finally receive the much needed rights
they deserve without impinging on the equally important
rights of property owners.
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